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Controversy surrounds the role of the private sector in health service delivery, including primary care and
population health services. China’s recent health reforms call for non-discrimination against private providers and
emphasize strengthening primary care, but formal contracting-out initiatives remain few, and the associated
empirical evidence is very limited. This paper presents a case study of contracting with private providers for urban
primary and preventive health services in Shandong Province, China. The case study draws on three primary
sources of data: administrative records; a household survey of over 1600 community residents in Weifang and City
Y; and a provider survey of over 1000 staff at community health stations (CHS) in both Weifang and City Y. We
supplement the quantitative data with one-on-one, in-depth interviews with key informants, including local officials
in charge of public health and government finance.
We find significant differences in patient mix: Residents in the communities served by private community health
stations are of lower socioeconomic status (more likely to be uninsured and to report poor health), compared to
residents in communities served by a government-owned CHS. Analysis of a household survey of 1013 residents
shows that they are more willing to do a routine health exam at their neighborhood CHS if they are of low
socioeconomic status (as measured either by education or income). Government and private community health
stations in Weifang did not statistically differ in their performance on contracted dimensions, after controlling for
size and other CHS characteristics. In contrast, the comparison City Y had lower performance and a large gap
between public and private providers. We discuss why these patterns arose and what policymakers and residents
considered to be the main issues and concerns regarding primary care services.
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Introduction
Controversy surrounds the role of the private sector in
delivering basic health services covered by public finan-
cing, especially in developing and transitional econ-
omies. The economic theory of contracting out [1]
suggests that although private providers generally have
stronger incentives for cost control, whether their qual-
ity is higher or lower than that of public providers
depends on organizational incentives. Concerns about
the uneven quality of private providers are frequent
among policymakers [2]. Loevinsohn and Harding [3]* Correspondence: karene@stanford.edu
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in any medium, provided the original work is pargue that contracting for health service delivery from
the private sector can improve quality and access, and a
recent systematic review does find a positive impact of
private providers on the quality of primary or public
health services for the poor [4]. Yet it is not always clear
how sensitive these results are to the institutional con-
text of contracting, and the overall evidence base re-
mains relatively thin.
In urban China, private providers play an important
minority role in supplying primary health care services.
The national health reforms begun in 2009 emphasize
strengthening primary care and call for non-discrimination
against private providers [5]. Statements by top Chinese
officials about the next phase of health reforms beginning
in 2012 also emphasize the importance of encouraging
private participation in health service delivery, as well as
continuing to strengthen primary care and link paymentn Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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formal contracting initiatives that incorporate private
providers remain few, and the associated empirical evi-
dence is very limited [6-10].
To help lay the foundation for filling this evidence gap,
the present study provides some descriptive information
about public and private sector involvement in primary
care in urban China. We collect data on patients and
providers affected by a natural experiment in contracting
with private providers for urban primary and preventive
health services in Shandong Province, China. In June
2008, the city of Weifang used a public bidding process to
select and contract with 63 community health stations
(CHS) – 30 government-owned and 33 private facilities.
The contract stipulated payment from public funds for
designated services, inclusion in the expanded social in-
surance coverage system, and the ability to receive profes-
sional training and financial assistance for investments
in infrastructure. All buildings and medical equipment
purchased through the program revert to the government
at the end of the contract period. In exchange, contracted
providers must adhere to policies governing service
provision, quality of care, and regulatory oversight.
Our study uses routine monitoring data collected by
the Weifang and provincial departments of health,
supplemented by additional survey data from a sub-
sample of patients and providers, to describe the imple-
mentation process of this contracting-out experiment
and to outline a research agenda for future studies that
aim to estimate the impact of contracting policies. The
paper describes trends in data spanning one year before
and after the policy implementation in Weifang and a
neighboring city of similar size that did not contract
with private providers on equal terms with government
providers. Our case study addresses the following ques-
tions: What motivated local officials to contract with
public and private providers? What measures of per-
formance were included in the contract? Were there sys-
tematic differences in the patient populations served by
providers of different ownership forms? What were the
trends in the measured dimensions of performance?
How did policymakers, providers, and patients perceive
the quality of primary and preventive services at
providers of different ownership? And what additional
information should be gathered at baseline, during and
after implementation if local governments and inde-
pendent scholars wish to determine the causal impact of
such contracting initiatives? This case study from urban
Shandong may help to inform future analyses of China’s
policies and those of other low- and middle-income
countries seeking to integrate private providers into
systems for better access and quality at affordable cost.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section
provides background information on China’s healthsystem, the limited role of private sector delivery, and re-
cent policies supporting primary health care. We then
describe the 2008 contracting reform in Weifang, our
quantitative and qualitative data about that reform, and
our methods for analyzing the data to control for
confounding factors. The final sections present our de-
scriptive results about the Weifang case study and dis-
cuss policy implications.
China’s health reforms and the role of private health
service providers
China’s economic reforms have spurred unprecedented
economic growth and improved living standards, but the
transition to a market-oriented economy has also been
associated with health policy challenges, including rapid
growth in health care spending. Public hospitals received
only minimal public investment and were required to
raise revenue by charging patients for services. Patients
in turn lacked risk pooling arrangements, so the burden
of out-of-pocket expenditure increased [11,12].
Since 1980, China’s regulatory framework has allowed
private medical practice, to help alleviate the shortage of
public sector medical services. Private sector delivery
grew but remained limited; by 1990, only 3.3 percent of
health workers at the township or higher levels were
in private practice [13]. Although a shortage of data
precludes a comprehensive picture of private delivery
nationally, it appears concentrated at two polar ex-
tremes: on the one hand, “top-end” private providers in
China’s largest cities offer advanced medical care with
high-tech equipment at very high prices compared to
national per capita income; on the other hand, small pri-
vate clinics and village doctors in towns, villages, and
newly urbanized areas offer a mixture of traditional
herbal and biomedicine services at low prices to trad-
itionally underserved or vulnerable populations. Some
studies suggest that private providers have gradually
earned a market share, at least among certain social
groups, through lower prices, more flexible hours, better
attitudes, and convenience [10]. However, many com-
plaints and lawsuits against private providers allege poor
quality, fake drugs, and unqualified staff. Since the early
1990s, laws and rules have set minimum standards of
care, but the controversy over the appropriate role of
private providers continues [7,10]. Private providers
complain that they are unfairly treated compared to
their public counterparts across a range of policies, such
as purchasing pharmaceuticals, hiring and training
personnel, or obtaining contracts for clinical servi-
ces provided to beneficiaries of social health insurance
plans.
These perceptions contributed to the reform debate
that culminated in China’s national health reforms,
announced in April 2009. These reforms open up policy
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vider network for social insurance and population health
services.
Community health services in urban china
Traditionally, health care in urban areas has primarily
consisted of hospitals, which run large outpatient
departments. Beginning in the 1990s, policymakers began
to establish a system of community-based health service
centers in urban areas to meet the needs associated with
China’s demographic and epidemiological transitions and
rapid urbanization. Unclear policy priorities and lack of
fiscal support led to slow development: by 2006, commu-
nity health service organizations – centers and stationsa
[2] – only accounted for 8.9 percent of total health care
organizations and 2.7 percent of health workers in urban
areas [14]. Since 2006, China has encouraged the develop-
ment of community-based health services by providing fi-
nancial subsidies for some services, extending health
insurance coverage to qualified community providers, and
encouraging private providers to join the community
health service network, while nevertheless maintaining
government-owned providers as the dominant ownership
form [15]. According to a 2007 survey of 28 large cities,
about one in five urban community health service
organizations is privately owned [14].
One goal of China’s current health reforms is to guar-
antee all Chinese access to basic health care, including
having a community health provider within walking dis-
tance. The 2009 national health reforms encourage pri-
vate sector participation, while leaving the detailed
implementation up to local authorities. Cities such as
Shanghai, Beijing, Wuxi, Foshan, Tieling, and Jixi have
started to incorporate private providers into contracting
arrangements for primary and preventive health services,
but little information is available about the process and
perceived success of these initiatives [16].
In June 2008, authorities in Weifang, Shandong, used
a public bidding process to select and contract with both
government-owned and private facilities for preventive
health services and selected clinical services. Our case
study examines the implementation of this reform.
Case study setting and data
Case study setting
Weifang is in coastal Shandong province. GDP per capita
in 2008 was $4112, and urban residents’ income per
capita was $2307.50, close to the national average. In
2008, Weifang urban residents’ medical expenditure per
capita was $171.38 [17]. To provide some comparative
context for understanding Weifang’s reforms, we also
discuss the process of contracting for primary care in
City Y, which is near Weifang. In 2008, City Y’s GDP per
capita was $7171, urban resident income per capita was$2845, and urban resident medical expenditure per capita
was $148.38 [18].
From the mid-1990s to 2004, Weifang was one of
the few cities in China that attempted to establish a net-
work of primary care providers and reduce reliance
on hospital-based services. All included primary care
organizations were government-owned and managed [19].
Local authorities felt that this initiative had achieved only
limited success, and that attempts to further strengthen
the primary care delivery network would benefit from
fresh approaches. Therefore in 2008, the city government
decided to promote community health services by con-
tracting with public and private providers on equal terms.
Weifang’s contracting policies
An important objective of the 2008 policy change was to
influence private providers’ revenue structure, giving
incentives to provide the newly contracted preventive
health services (Table 1) as well as enabling them to
compete on a more equal footing for patients seeking
curative primary care services.
Specific features of Weifang’s contracting reform in-
cluded the following:
 Private providers could become part of the
community health system through bidding and
contracting with the local government.
 Private providers that successfully competed for a
contract could apply for financial subsidies for
medical equipment, with the stipulation that the
equipment purchased with government funds must
be returned if the private provider were to withdraw
from the community health system.b
 Private providers were required to provide
preventive health services which would be
reimbursed from the government’s budget after an
annual evaluation; see Table 1.c In 2008–2009, the
maximum payment for preventive and management
services was 10 RMB per resident, payable in whole
only if the CHS earned a performance score of 90 or
higher. The CHS would receive 70 percent (i.e., 7
RMB per resident) if its score was between 80 and
90; 50 percent (i.e., 5 RMB per resident) if the
performance score was between 60 and 80; and no
subsidies if its score was less than 60. The CHS
administrators were aware of this formula before the
contracting period started.
 Clinical care provided by contracted private
providers would be covered by social health
insurance plans, enabling them to compete for
insured patients and get equal access to the drugs
listed on the new Essential Medication List (EML).
The EML medications are jointly procured by the
Weifang bureaus of finance and health and
Table 1 Pay-for-performance in Chinese urban primary care: Criteria for community health station performance scores
in Weifang, Shandong
Items Weights (W) Assessment indicators (A) Scoring (S)
1. Understanding of the community served 3 Evaluation grade 0 to 3
2. Community members’ health records 10 X2/R A2*W2
3. Health education 10 X3/R A3*W3
4. Infectious disease reporting 3 Evaluation grade 0 to 3
5. Chronic disease management * 20 X5/R5 A5*W5
6. Maternal health care 5 X6/R6 A6*W6
7. Child health care 5 X7/R7 A7*W7
8. Elderly health care 5 X8/R8 A8*W8
9. Health care for the disabled 5 X9/R9 A9*W9
10. Public emergency response 4 Evaluation grade 0 to 4




*The patient cases which are supposed to be managed include patients with diagnosis of hypertension, diabetes, coronary heart disease, and stroke.
Note: Subscripts refer to the item number. For example, A2 refers to the assessment indicator for item 2, and W2 denotes weight given to item 2 in the overall
assessment score. The assessment indictor is the percentage of the relevant population in the provider’s catchment area that the provider has served (except for
three items that resemble public goods, which are evaluated by a group of supervisors). For example, X2 is the number of residents who have health records
created and maintained by the Community Health Station (CHS); R is the number of residents who live in the community served by the CHS. Similarly, X3 is the
number of residents with access to health education materials; X5 and R5 are the numbers of treated and suspected chronic disease cases in the community; X6
and R6 are the number of women the CHS provides with systematic health care and the number of women living in the community, respectively; X7 and R7 are
the number of children covered by physical monitoring and guideline treatment and the number of children living in the community; X8 and R8 respectively
represent the number of elderly provided with home visits and physical monitoring and the number of elderly people living in the community; X9 and R9 are the
number of the disabled residents with access to rehabilitation and home visits and the number of disabled people living in the community; X11 and R11 are the
numbers of interviewees satisfied with the CHS and total number of interviewed residents in the community, respectively.
Wang et al. Health Economics Review 2013, 3:1 Page 4 of 20
http://www.healtheconomicsreview.com/content/3/1/1distributed directly to CHS throughout the
municipality. Each CHS is reimbursed directly for
prescribing medications on the list.
 Personnel working at private CHS were included in
capacity-building programs of the local health
administration that had previously been limited to
the employees of government-owned CHS. These
programs included (1) training courses and
guidelines about qualified health services; (2)
feedback and monitoring during routine inspections
and evaluations; and (3) technical support from local
general hospitals [20-27].
In June 2008, Weifang authorities chose 63 bidders as
official community health stations (CHS) to provide the
population health and primary care needs of the resident
population. Each CHS served between 5,000 and 10,000
residents. 30 were government-owned and 33 were pri-
vate facilities.d All met standards regarding staffing,
space, and equipment.e
City Y also contracted with both public (22) and pri-
vate (44) CHS for preventive services, using the same
evaluation criteria (Table 1 and first row of Table 2).
However, this was the only revenue source that was
available to private providers on the same terms as pub-
lic providers: private CHS in City Y were not given ac-
cess to government subsidies for equipment or technical
guidance, and were not included in the provider networkfor social insurance. Thus City Y is similar to many parts
of China (including Weifang before 2008) regarding the
role of private providers.
All CHS in both cities are non-profit and thus do not
pay taxes. Table 2 describes the revenue sources of pub-
lic and private providers before and after the reform in
Weifang, compared to City Y.
Data collection
We collected data from three primary sources: adminis-
trative records at the municipal and provincial levels;
a household survey of 1013 community residents in
Weifang and 681 residents in City Y; and a provider
survey of 1298 staff at CHS in both Weifang and City Y.
For the household survey, a locally contextualized
questionnaire was developed in Chinese, based on the
Primary Care Assessment Tool (PCAT) of Johns Hopkins
University [28]. All communities were divided into two
groups according to ownership of the CHS designated to
serve patients in that area: residential communities
served by a government-owned CHS (Pub-C hereafter)
and communities served by a privately-owned CHS (Pri-
C hereafter). A total sample of 1013 households was
selected from the total number of households served by
the CHS, by first randomly selecting CHS in each owner-
ship group and then interviewing a quasi-random sample
of residents in those neighborhoods. In November 2009,
trained interviewers carried out the field work with




Weifang, 2007 (pre-reform) Weifang, 2009 (post-reform) City Y, 2009 (comparison city)
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some free training
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Yes, sell at acquisition price
to patient; government
pays the CHS the original
15% mark up for dispensing
EML drugs.
















































Covered, and at a more
generous rate than
hospitals. Patient co-
payments are lower than
for hospital outpatient
visits.























Covered, and at a more
generous rate than
hospitals. Patient co-
payments are lower than
for hospital outpatient
visits.











*1. The subsidies are decided by (a) the evaluation score as described in Table 1; and (b) the number of served residents. In 2008 and 2009, the per capita budget
for public health services was 10RMB. CHS with a score above 80 got 100% of the budget; CHS scoring between 70 and 80 got 90% of the budget; CHS scoring
between 60 and 70 got 80% of the budget; CHS scoring between 50 and 60 got 60% of the budget; and CHS scoring under 50 got no subsidies.
*2. The 70 drugs listed on the Essential Medicine List must be sold to patients at the acquisition price; if prescriptions from the EML represent more than 30% of
all prescriptions, the CHS receives a subsidy from the government equivalent to 15% of the drug price.
*3. The chronic diseases for which the CHS can be reimbursed by health insurance for associated outpatient expenses include stroke, diabetes, chronic viral
hepatitis, and autoimmune hepatitis.
*4. For the service items covered by insurance, CHS are reimbursed by insurers and patient copayments.
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holds were re-investigated by academic supervisors. In-
terviewees voluntarily participated in the survey with the
assurance of confidentiality. The study was conducted
according to policies of the Ministry of Health of Chinaand was approved by the Institutional Review Board at
Stanford University.
We supplement the household survey data with data
from anonymous questionnaires that were distributed to
all staff members in both public and private CHS in both
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the quantitative data with one-on-one, in-depth interviews
with key informants, including local health and finance
officials in charge of contracting with and paying CHS
institutions.
Methods
For descriptive and comparative analysis between public
and private providers, univariate, bivariate and multivari-
ate analyses were performed using SPSS for Windows,
version 11.0 and Stata 9.
Comparing providers of different ownership forms is
inherently complicated by the differences in their
characteristics. For example, smaller providers may have
systematically lower performance if there are economies
of scale and scope in performance, and private providers
tend to be systematically smaller than government-
owned providers. If mean performance scores are lower
for private CHS than public CHS, to what extent is this
difference because private CHS are smaller, rather than
because they are private? To answer such questions,
multivariate regressions that control for potentially
confounding factors are useful.
We run descriptive regressions of the following form:
yit ¼ λþ βiXit þ βOwnPrivatei þ βCityWeifangi
þ βOwnW Private Weifangð Þ þ uit ;
Where yit is the dependent variable of interest, such as
the performance score for provider i in year t; λ is a con-
stant; X represents a vector of observed characteristics
of the provider; βi is the set of estimated coefficients for
the characteristics in vector X; Privatei denotes private
ownership; Weifangi is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
provider i is located in Weifang, rather than City Y; and
uit denotes idiosyncratic errors. The primary estimated
coefficient of interest is βown_W, representing the differ-
ence in the dependent variable between private and pub-
lic providers in Weifang, compared to βown for City Y,
controlling for other observable characteristics. If
the sum of the estimated coefficients for Privatei and
Private * Weifang is statistically indistinguishable from
zero, then there is no statistically significant difference
in performance between public and private CHS in
Weifang, after controlling for the fact that smaller CHS
tend to have lower performance scores in both Weifang
and City Y. Data limitations preclude any multi-year
analyses; all our regressions are cross-sectional.
For example, consider our analysis of factors associated
with CHS performance scores in 2009. In this analysis, t
= 2009 and yit is the 2009 performance score for CHS i;
the X vector includes such characteristics of the CHS as
number of beds, number of staff, fixed assets, a dummy
variable for being in the social health insurance networkas an appointed provider, and a dummy variable for
implementing the policy of separating prescribing and
dispensing.
One empirical challenge is that several of the CHS
characteristics are correlated (e.g., providers with more
beds also have more staff and are more likely to be
included in the insurance network as appointed providers).
To enable qualitative statements about CHS of different
ownership form with otherwise similar characteristics, we
present results for multiple specifications of each regres-
sion, alternatively including different sets of explanatory
variables. We confine our discussion of the primary esti-
mate of interest—βown_W —to the case in which the esti-
mate is relatively unchanged across these difference
specifications. Stability of the estimate across different em-
pirical specifications reflects robustness to different ways
of controlling for the observable differences among
providers.
These multivariate regressions are not intended to
constitute an impact evaluation of the contracting
reforms in Weifang. Several limitations of the available
data preclude a research design that could evaluate im-
pact or disentangle causality. For example, we lack base-
line data for pre-reform trends in Weifang and the
comparison group; and two years is probably too short a
time frame for an evaluation of most dimensions of pro-
vider performance. Rather than an impact evaluation,
the analyses document differences between ownership
forms, controlling for observable factors (such as size).
Such analyses enable statements of the form “public and
private CHS differ in size and staffing, but once we con-
trol for these differences, public and private CHS no
longer statistically differ in their performance scores in
Weifang in 2009.”
We also use the survey data of CHS personnel to ex-
plore the factors associated with staff satisfaction and
performance scores of community health stations in
Weifang and City Y. In those regressions, in addition
to the performance score yit for t=2009, we define a
second dependent variable to be equal to 1 if the staff
member reports being satisfied with his or her job. For
the latter limited dependent variable, we use a logit
analysis. The X vector of observed characteristics of
staff member i includes a dummy variable if male; age
and aged squared; years of work experience at the
CHS; and dummy variables for educational attainment
and job position (i.e., general practitioner, nurse, man-
ager, pharmacist, technician).
A third and final set of multivariate analyses describes
the association between resident characteristics and their
utilization of CHS services. Suppose that we find, as we
do, that on average more residents served by private
CHS than public CHS say they are willing to do rou-
tine examinations at the CHS. Is this because private
Table 3 Comparing public and private community health
stations before and after Weifang’s reform, compared
to City Y
Indicators (Mean) Weifang Y
Public Private Public Private
(30) (26) (23)
Performance score (evaluation by supervisors regarding contracted
preventive services)
2007 —— —— —— ——
2009 83.75 82.76 78.22 70.35
Value of fixed assets (RMB)
2007 —— —— —— ——
2009 168.50 42.59 29.83 22.52
Average number of staff members
2007 10.50 7.88 —— ——
2009 9.36 8.65 11.13 8.11
Government subsidies as a percentage of total revenue
2007 15.57 —— —— ——
2009 41.72 50.22 36.42 4.81
Expenditure per visit (RMB)
2007 35.79 12.26 —— ——
2009 29.27 14.42 59.54 39.91
Patient visits per staff member
2007 465.21 1245.23 —— ——
2009 483 1149 686.67 941.68
Home visits by per staff member
2007 24.20 29.47 —— ——
2009 19.49 39.47 10.62 29.17
Number of home beds per staff member
2007 1.40 12.43 —— ——
2009 0.64 17.72 3.98 8.50
Referrals to inpatient treatment (%)
2007 0.57 0.27 —— ——
2009 0.49 0.39 1.49 0.06
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counterparts do, or because the residents in private-CHS
communities tend to use community services more
often than hospital outpatient departments? To address
this question, we run logistic regressions of the following
form:
Yi ¼ λþ βiXi þ ui
The dependent variable Yi is a dichotomous variable
about the health service utilization of individual i. For
example, to estimate the probability of being served by a
privately owned provider, Yi is equal to 1 if the resident
lives in a community served by a private CHS; to esti-
mate the probability that the resident is willing to use
the community provider (rather than go to a hospital
outpatient department), Yi is equal to 1 if the resident
says he or she is willing to do a routine health exam at
the neighborhood CHS, or is willing to visit the CHS for
first-contact care when feeling ill. The dichotomous ex-
planatory variables Xi include male; uninsured; self-
reported poor health status; low education; and low
income (i.e., monthly income below 800 RMB). These
regressions allow us to see whether utilization pref-
erences are systematically associated with the individual
socioeconomic characteristics of community residents.
Standard errors are clustered at the CHS level.
Results
Performance scores for contracted services
The average 2009 performance scores for the contracted
population health services in Weifang were higher than
in City Y, with no statistically significant difference by
ownership (Table 3). In Weifang, the average perform-
ance scores for public and private CHS were 83.75 and
82.76 respectively. In contrast, City Y’s overall perform-
ance was lower and there was a significant gap between
the scores of public and private CHS (78.22 for public
and 70.35 for private CHS). It is unclear from these
scores whether the contracting initiative in Weifang was
cause or effect; Weifang’s authorities turned out to have
been justified in their assumption that private CHS
could provide community services at a comparable level
as their government-owned counterparts. The gap in
performance between public and private CHS in City Y,
in turn, suggests that either the lack of supportive pol-
icies contributed to a gap in performance by ownership;
or City Y authorities were justified to think that private
CHS in City Y were not prepared and willing to meet
the same targets for preventive and primary care services
as the public CHS were; or both.
Differences in performance scores between CHS of dif-
ferent ownership form, and among CHS of the same
ownership form, could be partly explained by differencesin the underlying capacity of the provider organizations.
Particularly if there are fixed costs in establishing admin-
istrative systems for monitoring community services and
economies of scale and scope in outreach, then larger
CHS will have an advantage in meeting the thresholds
for acceptable (reimbursable) performance for the vari-
ous population health services.
We find that in both Weifang and City Y, the average
value of fixed assets of public CHS is larger than that of
private CHS. Interviews confirm that this discrepancy
arises primarily because government providers own their
facilities, whereas most private providers lease their facil-
ities. Private CHS in Weifang increased the average
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nity service network providers. Most of the public CHS
already had enough staff to meet the criteria.
During the implementation of the contracting reform,
providers experienced a significant change in their rev-
enue structure. Information from interviews confirmed
that the revenue change was especially salient for private
providers, because they had never before received public
financing. For public CHS in Weifang, the percentage of
subsidies out of total revenue increased from 13 percent
in 2007 to 42 percent in 2009. Since many private CHS
did not exist or were not part of any standardized ad-
ministrative record system in 2007, we do not have com-
parable pre-reform data for private CHS. We do know
that by 2009, fully half of reported revenue for private
CHS in Weifang came from government subsidies. This
large proportion of income reflects both the new subsid-
ies for preventive services and equipment, and the lower
market share of private CHS in curative services.
The significance of the contracting policies in shaping
this change in revenue structure for primary care
providers is evident when comparing Weifang to City Y.
In 2009, private CHS in City Y earned less than 5 percent
of their revenue from government subsidies. City Y paid
subsidies only for the contracted preventive services, and
private providers in Y were less likely to receive those
subsidies in full because of lower performance scores
compared to government-owned CHS in City Y; see
Table 4.
In discussing the performance of primary care pro-
viders, it is important not only to consider the average
performance score, but also the distribution of the per-
formance scores [1]. Table 4 summarizes this distribu-
tion for both cities in 2009. Compared to Weifang, the
dispersion of performance scores is greater in City Y,
where the scores spanned the entire gamut from highest
(fully reimbursed) to worst (unreimbursed) performance.
The distribution of City Y private providers’ scores is of
similar dispersion but shifted downward in mean va-





Weifang Government 6 (91.00) 18 (8
Private 3 (92.80) 21 (8
City Y Government 2 (93.30) 6 (84
Private 0 7 (85
TOTAL Government 8 (91.58) 24 (8
Private 3 (92.80) 28 (8
Total 11 (91.91) 52 (8
Notes: Each cell represents the number of community health stations in that catego
reported in parentheses.government providers (or compared to Weifang
providers of either ownership form). Only 8 of 120
providers scored below 60 and were thus denied any
subsidies; all 8 of those CHS were private providers in
City Y.
The expenditure per visit in public CHS was higher
than in private CHS in both Weifang and City Y. This
crude metric of spending (obtained by dividing total
reported revenue by number of visits) reflects both the
mix of services provided as well as the use of resources
per visit. With government-owned CHS providing more
clinical services and referrals to hospitals, it is not sur-
prising that resource use per visit would be higher.f
Private CHS provided more visits per staff member
than public CHS did, with a larger ownership difference
in Weifang than City Y. This ownership difference in
visits per staff member in Weifang was narrower in 2009
than before reform.
That private providers actively sought out niches in
the market is evident from ownership differences in
community-oriented clinical services: private CHS were
more active in providing home visits to temporarily im-
mobile patients, or regular home visits for the elderly and
other patients with special needs. Public providers re-
ferred more often to specialty care than private providers
did, but the ownership-associated gap in referrals was
smaller in Weifang in 2009 than before reform.
Table 5 presents the factors associated with CHS per-
formance scores in a multivariate context to control for
potentially confounding observable factors. The results
confirm that while private CHS scored lower than public
CHS, the difference disappeared for Weifang, where there
is no statistically significant difference in performance be-
tween public and private CHS (see Additional file 1:
Appendix Table S2 for the corresponding F tests).
Data from household surveys
Table 6 shows the socioeconomic status of interviewed
households. Residents in districts served by public CHS
(the Pub-C group) are generally of higher socioeconomicalth stations in Weifang and City Y in 2009
n 80 and 90
f budget)
Score between 60 and 80
(got 50% of budget)
Score below 60
(no subsidies)
3.12) 9 (77.12) 0
2.96) 7 (76.79) 0
.53) 16 (73.97) 0
.49) 25 (72.36) 8 (50.81)
3.47) 25 (75.11) 0
3.59) 32 (73.33) 8 (50.81)
4.54) 57 (74.11) 8 (50.81)
ry, with the associated average score, conditional on being in that category,
Table 5 Factors associated with CHS performance scores, 2009
Dependent variable: 2009 performance score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Private −6.212 −7.030 −7.026 −5.548 −5.311
(3.651)* (3.615)* (3.506)** (3.556) (3.505)
Weifang 5.578 6.234 6.313 6.368 6.994
(2.273)** (2.137)*** (1.999)*** (2.351)*** (2.223)***
Private*Weifang 7.480 7.585 7.273 6.789 6.035
(3.940)* (3.885)* (3.709)* (3.874)* (3.809)
Clinic space (m2) 0.007 −0.000 0.000
(0.004)* (0.001) (0.001)
Value of fixed assets −0.023 −0.007 −0.007
(0.014) (0.008) (0.007)
Number of beds 0.296 0.330 0.352 0.248 0.277
(0.280) (0.267) (0.249) (0.268) (0.264)
Number of staff members 0.206 0.147 0.120 0.362 0.323
(0.194) (0.168) (0.158) (0.205)* (0.179)*




Dummy for implementing the policy of
separating prescribing from dispensing
1.939 −0.754 0.604
(2.608) (2.229) (2.226)
Constant 70.534 72.637 72.083 70.907 70.283
(3.793)*** (3.755)*** (2.693)*** (3.770)*** (2.910)***
Observations 90 100 106 92 94
Adjusted R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.21 0.15 0.18
Notes: 1) Robust standard errors in parentheses; 2) ***, **, * refer to 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance level, respectively.
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group). Compared to Pub-C, private CHS serve catchment
areas with fewer formal employees and more unemployed
residents, retirees, and farmers. Private CHS catchment
areas also have a significant minority of residents in the
lowest income group, and residents with no more than an
elementary school education. These differences are not
surprising, since public CHS developed first in the central
urban neighborhoods, whereas private CHS tend to be
located in suburbs or newly urban areas where the major-
ity of residents are domestic immigrants and former
farmers.
Residents’ attitudes towards CHS and utilization patterns
As shown in Table 7, about two-thirds of residents knew
the names or addresses of their neighborhood CHS. 67.2
percent of respondents reported that at least one family
member had ever visited the neighborhood CHS. With
an average household size of three, this means that at
least one in five residents had visited their neighborhood
CHS.g
Comparing public and private CHS, we find that more
residents in Pri-C (51.1 percent) had received infor-mation from their neighborhood CHS than those in
Pub-C (41.4 percent). Residents served by a private CHS
were also more likely to report willingness to visit the
CHS for a routine examination or for first-contact care
when ill. Respondents who had previously visited the
CHS were more willing to do so again than residents who
had never visited the CHS, and the gap favoring private
facilities remains. These results may indicate that private
providers serve communities more likely to visit a CHS
than a hospital for first-contact care, and that private
CHS probably offered relatively stronger incentives to
staff members for marketing their services than their pub-
lic counterparts. There were no significant differences
between public and private CHS regarding residents’
perceived ability to reach doctors by phone and providers’
knowledge about their families.
A simple descriptive regression (Table 8) confirms
differences in the communities served by public and pri-
vate CHS, and in residents’ patterns of utilization. The
first column shows that residents in the communities
served by private CHS were more likely to be uninsured
and to report poor health, compared to residents in public
CHS communities (Pub-C). Controlling for other factors,
Table 6 Profile of household respondents
Socio-economic
variables (%)


















Female 60.1 59.6 60.6 1.01 59.5 59.2 59.7 0.49
Male 39.3 40.0 38.7 −1.27 40.2 40.5 40.1 −0.42
Occupation
Civil Servant 2.9 2.9 2.8 −0.10 2.6 3.0 2.4 −0.65
Formal employee 35.4 41.8 30.5 −11.34*** 36.6 44.1 30.6 −13.52***
Informal employee 10.6 10.8 10.4 −0.40 9.3 10.0 8.6 −1.39
Unemployed 7.3 5.2 9.0 3.81** 7.6 4.0 10.5 6.46***
Farmer 2.9 1.8 3.7 1.90* 2.3 2.3 2.4 0.01
Retired 27.1 24.3 29.4 5.13* 29.4 24.1 33.5 9.43***
Student and preschool
children
1.8 1.8 1.8 −0.04 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.04
Others 11.5 11.2 11.6 0.38 10.6 11.0 10.2 −0.83
Education
Elementary school or lower 13.7 11.2 15.7 4.43** 13.2 11.0 14.9 3.88
Middle school 29.5 27.9 30.8 2.94 28.6 26.4 30.4 3.95
High school 29.0 30.8 27.6 −3.15 29.2 31.1 27.7 −3.35
Junior college 16.6 16.9 16.4 −0.48 17.3 17.7 17.0 −0.71
College 9.8 11.0 8.8 −2.21 10.4 11.7 9.4 −2.28
Master degree 0.8 1.6 0.2 −1.40** 0.6 1.3 0.0 −1.34**
Doctorate 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00
Monthly income
<400 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00
400-800 12.5 8.8 15.5 6.73*** 11.0 7.7 13.6 5.92**
800-1200 24.6 25.2 24.1 −1.05 26.6 27.1 26.2 −0.91
1200-1600 20.1 19.3 20.8 1.45 19.8 18.4 20.9 2.55
1600-2400 15.6 17.5 14.1 −3.44 16.6 19.7 14.1 −5.60*
2400-3000 6.5 9.0 4.6 −4.41*** 5.9 9.4 3.1 −6.22
3000-4000 5.4 7.0 4.2 −2.74* 5.0 6.4 3.9 −2.43
4000-6000 2.8 2.7 2.8 0.12 3.7 3.7 4.7 1.00
6000+ 1.4 0.4 2.1 1.66** 1.9 0.3 3.1 2.81***
Did not report 10.9 9.9 11.6 1.73 9.3 7.0 11.0 3.97*
Health insurance coverage
Urban employee 16.4 11.5 20.2 8.79*** 16.9 11.0 21.5 10.43***
Urban residents 24.6 29.4 20.8 −8.66*** 26.6 33.4 21.2 −12.24***
NCMS 1.9 2.0 1.8 −0.26 1.6 2.3 1.0 −1.29
Commercial insurance 3.7 4.9 2.6 −2.30* 2.8 3.3 2.4 −0.99
OOP 52.6 51.2 53.7 2.46 51.5 49.2 53.4 4.24
Self reported health status
Excellent 9.4 9.4 9.3 −0.11 9.1 8.7 9.4 0.73
Very good 34.0 39.8 29.4 −10.37*** 32.2 36.8 28.5 −8.26**
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Table 6 Profile of household respondents (Continued)
Good 34.3 31.9 36.1 4.18 35.7 35.1 36.1 1.01
Not bad 17.0 13.9 19.4 5.43** 17.2 14.4 19.4 4.99*
Bad 5.1 4.5 5.6 1.14 5.6 4.7 6.3 1.60
Notes: 1) Pub-C refers to a catchment area served by a public (government-owned) CHS; Pri-C refers to a catchment area served by a private CHS; 2) * New
Cooperative Medical System; 3) ***, **, * refer to 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance level, respectively; here we report proportion test (‘prtest’ in Stata) results
(P-values) for public-private differences, rather than mean (‘ttest’ in Stata) because the ttest command relies on some distributional assumptions that may not be
true for each component; 4) the summation for each category may not equal 100% because of missing values.
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presumably because they were less likely than insured
residents to seek formal treatment for illness or prevent-
ive services. When controlling for individual charac-
teristics, we find that residents were more willing to do a
routine health exam at their neighborhood CHS if they
were of low socioeconomic status (as measured either by
education or income) and if the CHS was private.h Results
regarding resident willingness to visit the CHS for first-
contact care are similar to those for routine exams:
insured patients, those of low socioeconomic status, and
those served by private CHS were more likely to visit the
CHS when ill. These patterns are consistent with the
long-standing perception of CHS in China as providing
convenient but lower quality care than hospital outpatient
departments.Residents’ evaluations
Responses to survey questions about primary health care
are shown in Table 9, conditional on the respondent
having visited a CHS. In contrast with general residents
(who may not have ever visited the CHS before and who
generally were not aware of the CHS hours of
operationi), respondents who had visited their neighbor-
hood CHS were more knowledgeable about and favor-
ably disposed toward CHS services.
There remains significant room for improvement
among all CHS. Only about half of patients said that
CHS providers spent enough time talking with them
about their medical problems, were familiar with their
current prescriptions, or asked about their prescriptions
during the visit. Fewer than half of patients reported that
their doctors definitely or probably would (a) help make
an appointment at a referral hospital, or (b) know the
results of the hospital treatment during a follow-up visit
at the CHS.
Comparing public and private CHS, a small statis-
tically significant difference favoring private CHS is evi-
dent when residents were asked whether providers had
given suggestions on healthy and unhealthy foods and
the benefits of enough sleep; talked with them about
household safety measures such as proper storage of
chemicals; asked them to fill out a questionnaire to
better understand community needs; and understoodpatients’ situation when patients had difficulty paying
their medical bills.
Thus, although household survey respondents gener-
ally gave low evaluations of CHS, residents with experi-
ence at CHS were more knowledgeable and favorable
about CHS, with more favorable responses for private
CHS on the few dimensions where there were ownership
differences. It would, however, be premature to conclude
that private CHS did better than public facilities in terms
of family-centered and community-oriented primary
health care, because these differences are small and may
partly reflect the socioeconomic status of the residents.
Furthermore, local health officials gave contradictory
reports during our in-depth interviews (i.e., that public
health stations seemed more serious and diligent about
finishing the required public health tasks, including pa-
tient and community questionnaires). Moreover, among
general surveyed residents (as opposed to those who had
visited the CHS), more respondents in Pub-C than in
Pri-C thought their doctors definitely or probably could
help them make appointments at referral hospitals. This
difference may reflect the fact that most public CHS are
run by public hospitals, and therefore can readily refer
patients for inpatient services.
Staff in public and private community health stations
Table 10 reports the socioeconomic characteristics and
self-evaluations of CHS staff. In Weifang, private CHS
had more staff in both the young age group (<25) and
the older group (>60) compared to staff at public CHS,
probably because new private providers recruit recent
graduates from medical school and retirees. There were
no significant differences in education between public
and private providers in these two cities. Different tech-
nical titles were found in City Y and Weifang, although
the majority in both had primary or middle technical
titles. The income gap between public and private
employees in Weifang was less than in City Y: public
employees in Y reported much higher income than pri-
vate employees.
Private employees, however, reported higher job satisfac-
tion than public employees. This may be because public
employees tend to compare themselves with (former and
future) colleagues in public hospitals who tend to enjoy bet-
ter opportunities for career development than employees at





















Know the name or address of the neighborhood CHS
No 35.3 37.8 33.5 −4.30 21.1 23.4 19.4 −4.04
Yes 64.7 62.2 66.5 4.30 78.9 76.6 80.6 4.04
At least one family member visited this CHS before
No 26.6 27.9 25.5 −2.34 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00
Yes 67.2 67.2 67.3 0.06 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.00
Not sure/Forgot 5.7 4.9 6.3 1.39 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00
Willing to do routine examination at this CHS
No 26.7 31.9 22.5 −9.37*** 16.6 21.1 13.1 −7.98***
Yes 49.0 42.2 54.2 11.98*** 65.5 58.5 70.9 12.41***
Not sure 22.6 25.6 20.2 −5.37* 17.5 20.4 15.2 −5.22*
First visit this CHS when sick
No 24.9 30.8 20.2 −10.54*** 12.2 17.1 8.4 −8.68***
Yes 52.0 47.2 55.8 8.62*** 69.8 64.5 73.8 9.27***
Not sure 21.6 21.8 21.5 −0.32 18.1 18.4 17.8 −0.59
Received advertising materials from this CHS
Yes 46.1 41.3 49.8 8.48*** 56.5 53.2 59.2 5.99
No 34.6 40.0 30.3 −9.72*** 29.8 35.1 25.7 −9.46***
Not sure 17.9 18.4 17.4 −1.00 13.7 11.7 15.2 3.48
Can call responsible doctors at any time when needed
Yes 42.8 40.7 44.5 3.87 54.5 52.8 55.8 2.92
No 10.1 9.2 10.7 1.53 9.5 8.4 10.5 2.11
Not sure 45.3 49.7 41.9 −7.76** 35.8 38.5 33.8 −4.69
Do providers at this CHS know the health status of your family members?
Very well 5.6 5.6 5.6 0.02 7.3 7.7 7.1 −0.62
Yes 32.1 31.9 32.2 0.31 42.7 41.8 43.5 1.65
No 38.4 36.9 39.6 2.76 28.8 26.1 30.9 4.80
Not sure 22.2 25.4 19.7 −5.67* 21.1 24.4 18.6 −5.83*
Notes: 1) Pub-C refers to a catchment area served by a public (government-owned) CHS; Pri-C refers to a catchment area served by a private CHS; 2) * New
Cooperative Medical System; 3) ***, **, * refer to 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance level, respectively; here we report proportion test (‘prtest’ in Stata) results
(P-values) for public-private differences, rather than mean (‘ttest’ in Stata) because the ttest command relies on some distributional assumptions that may not be
true for each component; 4) the summation for each category may not equal 100% because of missing values.
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the top-cited reasons were lack of social security, limi-
ted career paths, low income, and feeling overworked.
Compared to staff at public CHS, private providers showed
more confidence that they understood the local community
and that their patients would re-visit them. 64 percent of
Weifang staff but only 56 percent of City Y staff believed
that residents would choose the CHS for first-contact care,
with less of an ownership difference in Weifang.
Table 11 presents the results of multivariate regression
models examining the factors associated with CHS staffjob satisfaction and CHS performance scores. Job satis-
faction is higher at private CHS, with less of a public-
private difference in Weifang than in City Y. Other
factors associated with job satisfaction include the spe-
cific job of the staff member (e.g. technician vs. general
practitioner), age, and experience. The final column
shows that work experience at the current CHS is posi-
tively associated with a better CHS performance score.
Private CHS in City Y score significantly lower than
other CHS, but this is not true for Weifang, which is
consistent with the results reported earlier.
Table 8 Multivariate analysis of residents’ usage of community health station services (logistic regressions)




Probability that resident is
willing to do routine health
exam at neighborhood CHS
Probability that resident
is willing to visit the
neighborhood CHS as







Public CHS Private CHS All CHS All CHS All CHS











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Male -0.020 0.192 0.121 0.276 -0.098 0.083 -0.093 -0.190
(0.168) (0.135) (0.140) (0.250) (0.245) (0.173) (0.116) (0.175)
Uninsured 0.783 -0.349 -0.258 -0.788 0.743 0.114 -0.320 -0.113
(0.300)*** (0.133)*** (0.130)** (0.374)** (0.185)*** (0.253) (0.150)** (0.232)
Self reported poor health 0.344 0.139 -0.007 -0.038 -0.153 -0.060 -0.004 -0.131
(0.222) (0.180) (0.177) (0.272) (0.319) (0.192) (0.120) (0.163)
With no higher than compulsory
education
0.015 -0.124 0.139 0.861 0.151 0.419 0.016 0.113
(0.326) (0.213) (0.192) (0.400)** (0.394) (0.274) (0.205) (0.310)
Monthly income lower than 800RMB 0.346 0.050 0.418 -0.272 1.231 0.497 0.366 0.525
(0.437) (0.316) (0.230)* (0.597) (0.569)** (0.425) (0.198)* (0.386)
Neighborhood served by private CHC 0.180 0.499 0.434 0.405 0.412
(0.302) (0.412) (0.489) (0.378) (0.491)
Constant -0.109 0.909 -0.417 0.108 0.517 0.115 -0.070 0.627
(0.546) (0.245)*** (0.309) (0.394) (0.398) (0.379) (0.282) (0.403)
Observations 918 866 918 282 347 629 918 629





















Table 9 Comparison of residents’ evaluations of their neighborhood community health station, for residents who had
visited the station
Questions and Answers (%) Definitely Probably Probably not Definitely not Not sure/do not remember
Know this CHS to be open on weekends
all (N=681) 82.1 7.8 1.6 1.3 6.8
pub (N=299) 81.9 8.0 0.7 1.0 8.4
private (N=382) 82.2 7.6 2.4 1.6 5.5
Pri-Pub Difference 0.26 −0.44 1.69* 0.57 −2.86
Know this CHS to be open until 8:00 PM
all (N=681) 67.1 13.7 3.7 2.5 12.6
pub (N=299) 60.5 13.4 5.4 4.0 16.7
private (N=382) 72.3 13.9 2.4 1.3 9.4
Pri-Pub Difference 11.72*** 0.50 −3.00** −2.70** −7.30***
Enough time talking about patients’ medical problems and related concerns
all (N=681) 51.0 26.3 13.2 5.0 3.8
pub (N=299) 48.2 30.1 15.1 1.7 4.7
private (N=382) 53.1 23.3 11.8 7.6 3.1
Pri-Pub Difference 4.98 −6.80* −3.27 5.92*** −1.54
Understand patients’ situation when patients have difficulty in paying for drugs or other health expenditures
all (N=681) 18.6 23.5 25.4 14.1 17.5
pub (N=299) 12.7 26.8 25.4 14.7 20.4
private (N=382) 23.3 20.9 25.4 13.6 15.2
Pri-Pub Difference 10.59*** −5.81* −0.03 −1.10 −5.22*
Know patients’ current prescriptions or ask when the patient visits
all (N=681) 51.4 28.5 9.1 4.6 5.9
pub (N=299) 46.2 34.8 8.0 4.3 6.7
private (N=382) 55.5 23.6 9.9 4.7 5.2
Pri-Pub Difference 9.34** −11.22*** 1.92 0.36 −1.45
Able to change CHS if patients want
all (N=681) 20.9 23.2 23.2 17.0 15.1
pub (N=299) 22.4 25.4 26.8 13.4 12.0
private (N=382) 19.6 21.5 20.4 19.9 17.5
Pri-Pub Difference −2.77 −3.95 −6.34* 6.52** 5.50**
Discuss with patients other possible providers for treating the patients’ medical condition
all (N=681) 14.0 22.5 10.6 9.4 8.8
pub (N=299) 14.4 22.1 11.4 9.7 11.0
private (N=382) 13.6 22.8 9.9 9.2 7.1
Pri-Pub Difference −0.77 0.70 −1.42 −0.54 −3.97
Help patient to make appointment
all (N=681) 8.7 12.5 14.0 17.5 12.6
pub (N=299) 4.3 11.4 16.1 21.7 15.1
private (N=382) 12.0 13.4 12.3 14.1 10.7
Pri-Pub Difference 7.69*** 1.98 −3.75 −7.60** −4.32
Knowing patients’ results after patient visited a hospital
all (N=681) 15.9 15.1 15.3 10.3 8.7
pub (N=299) 14.7 15.4 17.7 9.7 11.0
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Table 9 Comparison of residents’ evaluations of their neighborhood community health station, for residents who had
visited the station (Continued)
private (N=382) 16.8 14.9 13.4 10.7 6.8
Pri-Pub Difference 2.04 −0.46 −4.37 1.03 −4.23
Discuss with patients after they come back from other hospitals
all (N=681) 17.9 17.2 11.2 11.0 7.9
pub (N=299) 18.7 16.4 14.4 9.7 9.4
private (N=382) 17.3 17.8 8.6 12.0 6.8
Pri-Pub Difference −1.45 1.41 −5.74** 2.34 −2.56
Give suggestions on healthy and unhealthy foods and the benefits of enough sleep
all (N=681) 53.9 30.5 6.5 4.8 3.7
pub (N=299) 48.5 33.8 8.0 5.4 4.0
private (N=382) 58.1 28.0 5.2 4.5 3.4
Pri-Pub Difference 9.62** −5.77 −2.79 −0.90 −0.61
Give suggestions on home safety such as storage of drugs and chemicals
all (N=681) 27.0 24.7 19.8 13.7 14.2
pub (N=299) 15.1 29.1 21.4 19.4 14.7
private (N=382) 36.4 21.2 18.6 9.2 13.9
Pri-Pub Difference 21.34*** −7.89** −2.82 −10.24*** −0.84
Ask questions on possible diseases or other health concerns of your family
all (N=681) 32.9 41.1 11.6 6.2 7.8
pub (N=299) 25.1 47.5 13.7 5.7 8.0
private (N=382) 39.0 36.1 9.9 6.5 7.6
Pri-Pub Difference 13.92 *** −11.37*** −3.76 0.86 −0.44
Provide home visits
all (N=681) 36.0 15.7 8.1 21.9 17.9
pub (N=299) 37.8 15.1 9.0 19.1 19.1
private (N=382) 34.6 16.2 7.3 24.1 17.0
Pri-Pub Difference −3.24 1.18 −1.70 5.02 −2.05
Ask patients to fill out a questionnaire to better understand patient demand for services
all (N=681) 31.3 23.5 8.8 17.5 18.5
pub (N=299) 20.1 29.4 11.0 18.7 20.7
private (N=382) 40.1 18.8 7.1 16.5 16.8
Pri-Pub Difference 19.99*** −10.58*** −3.97* −2.24 −3.98
Ask residents to fill out a questionnaire to better understand health issues in the served community
all (N=681) 28.8 26.9 8.2 16.4 19.2
pub (N=299) 21.1 29.4 10.7 16.7 22.1
private (N=382) 34.8 24.9 6.3 16.2 17.0
Pri-Pub Difference 13.75*** −4.56 −4.42** −0.49 −5.06
Notes: 1) ***, **, * refer to 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance level, respectively; here we report proportion test (‘prtest’ in Stata) results (P-values) for public-
private differences rather than mean (‘ttest’ in Stata) because the ttest command relies on some distributional assumptions that may not be true for each
component; 2) the summations for each category may not equal 100% because of missing values.
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Contracting with private providers is increasingly
discussed as an option for efficiently closing gaps in pri-
mary care coverage in low- and middle- income coun-
tries [29]. Private sector participation and managementpractices, in the health sector and beyond, can be at-
tractive when government agencies and providers appear
to be over-extended and/or inefficient [30]. Many
scholars have argued that given appropriate financial
incentives, the private sector will supply appropriate
Table 10 Comparison of community health station staff in Weifang and City Y
Indicators (%) Weifang City Y
All Pub-C Pri-C Pri-Pub Difference All Pub-C Pri-C Pri-Pub Difference
Gender
Female 75.4 77.6 69.3 −8.29*** 76.1 80.5 72.6 −7.93*
Male 24.6 22.4 30.7 8.29*** 23.9 19.5 27.4 7.93
Age
0-25 24.1 18.2 40.4 22.21*** 24.3 22.2 26.1 3.92
26-39 50.2 53.0 42.5 −10.46*** 36.6 38.9 34.8 −4.14
40-59 23.1 26.2 14.6 −11.54*** 29.6 34.6 25.7 −8.94**
60+ 1.2 0.4 3.5 3.11*** 9.9 4.9 13.9 9.05***
Working experience, total (years)
0-3 23.0 17.1 39.4 22.31*** 24.3 21.6 26.5 4.90
4-9 17.7 16.8 20.2 3.39 16.4 10.3 21.3 11.03***
10-19 35.1 39.8 22.0 −17.87*** 22.7 30.3 16.5 −13.75***
20+ 22.5 24.7 16.7 −7.93*** 35.9 36.8 35.2 −1.54
Working years in any CHS
0-3 79.7 76.9 87.5 10.59** 65.3 58.4 70.9 12.49**
4-9 8.5 9.5 5.9 −3.56** 21.4 20.5 22.2 1.63
10-19 3.6 4.2 2.1 −2.08* 6.7 14.1 0.9 −13.18***
20+ 0.6 0.4 1.0 0.67 3.6 4.3 3.0 −1.28
Working years in the current CHS
0-3 60.5 53.6 79.4 25.84*** 58.3 41.6 71.7 30.12***
4-9 10.8 10.1 12.5 2.43 14.5 14.1 14.8 0.73
10-19 14.7 18.6 4.2 −14.40*** 14.9 29.2 3.5 −25.71***
20+ 6.8 8.6 1.7 −6.85*** 5.5 12.4 0.0 −12.43***
Education
Middle health school 39.2 39.2 39.4 0.18 42.9 42.7 43.0 0.34
Junior college 46.0 44.8 49.5 4.72 38.1 36.8 39.1 2.37
Bachelor 14.5 15.3 12.2 −3.10 17.1 19.5 15.2 −4.24
Master and above 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.22 0.2 0.5 0.0 −0.54
Technical Title
Primary 55.5 55.2 56.1 0.85 46.3 36.8 53.9 17.16***
Junior 29.0 31.0 23.7 −7.28** 33.7 45.4 24.3 −21.06***
Senior 4.6 4.8 4.2 −0.62 11.6 9.7 13.0 3.31
No 10.5 8.1 17.1 8.98*** 7.2 7.6 7.0 −0.61
Annual income (RMB)
<800 9.2 9.9 7.3 −2.54 7.2 13.5 2.2 −11.34***
800-1000 14.8 12.9 20.2 7.31*** 13.3 8.6 17.0 8.31**
1000-1500 18.6 18.8 17.8 −1.07 21.2 11.9 28.7 16.80***
1500-2000 15.9 16.3 14.6 −1.67 18.3 17.3 19.1 1.83
2000-3000 8.1 9.0 5.6 −3.40* 10.4 15.7 6.1 −9.59***
>3000 31.7 31.0 33.8 2.82 27.5 30.3 25.2 −5.05
Satisfaction with current job
Very satisfied 17.4 14.7 25.1 10.42*** 16.4 13.5 18.7 5.18
Satisfied 45.2 43.1 50.9 7.76** 57.1 43.2 68.3 25.02***
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Table 10 Comparison of community health station staff in Weifang and City Y (Continued)
Dissatisfied 34.5 38.6 23.3 −15.21*** 22.7 37.8 10.4 −27.40***
Very dissatisfied 2.6 3.2 1.0 −2.12* 3.1 5.9 0.9 −5.08***
CHS staffs’ average self-assessed degree of knowledge about residents
Knowing residents in the served area# 69.4 66.8 76.6 9.81*** 71.4 65.8 76.0 10.23***
Willingness of residents to choose this CHS as the first visit# 64.0 62.0 69.5 7.51*** 55.8 50.4 60.4 10.02***
Notes: 1) ***, **, * refer to 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance level, respectively; 2) #here we report the averages of CHC staffs’ self assessed degree of
knowing residents in the served area and willingness of residents to choose this CHS as the first visit and relevant mean test (‘ttest’ in Stata) results (P-values) for
public-private differences, since staff answered with a continuous response (between 1-100%) for these two questions; 3) the summations for each category may
not equal 100% because of missing values.
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found that in 1997, Chinese village clinics subsidized
0.46 RMB per resident were willing to provide the
defined package of preventive services. Some observers
have argued that private providers may even be willing
to supply certain preventive services without payment in
order to enhance their reputation and expand market
share [31].
Our study addresses these important policy questions
through a case study of contracting for preventive health
services in urban China. We find, for example, that it
is important to take into account the socioeconomic
characteristics of the community served by providers of
different ownership forms. In Weifang, residents in the
communities served by private CHS are more likely to
be uninsured and to report poor health, compared to
residents in communities served by a government-
owned CHS. Comparisons also need to take account of
differences in provider size when discussing perform-
ance. In Weifang, private CHS tend to be smaller than
public CHS and to have somewhat lower performance
scores; but when comparing public and private CHS of
similar size, they have performance scores so close as to
be statistically indistinguishable.
In our study, the same basic purchasing mechanism
with the same contract price – 10 RMB per resident –
was associated with different performance in Weifang
and City Y. In Weifang, where private providers were on
a more equal footing with public providers, there were
essentially no ownership differences in contracted per-
formance. In contrast, the private sector in City Y did
not perform as well.
A key concern in China is that providers are overly fo-
cused on curative care, where they can earn fee-for-ser-
vice revenue, and tend to neglect preventive health
services and population health outreach services, which
may not generate any revenue. City Y policymakers
complained that private CHS preferred to focus on
profitable clinical treatment and were reluctant to pro-
vide preventive services, presumably because they were
unsure that payment would compensate for the directand opportunity costs in terms of foregone clinical ser-
vice revenue. The Weifang experience shows that the
purchasing agency might be able to overcome this bar-
rier by providing technical and financial support, as well
as calling for residents’ participation and community in-
volvement, which can be important in helping private
providers earn the trust of neighborhood residents.
Since in Weifang both public and private CHS pro-
vided preventive and outreach services when paid to do
so, our case study is consistent with the idea that both
public and private CHS could be willing to provide pre-
ventive services if the expected marginal revenue
matches or exceeds that to be expected from clinical
services, and the provider has clear guidelines and sup-
port. Our case study, particularly the synthesis of
interviews with policymakers and providers, suggest that
the provider contract should clearly state objectives and
performance criteria. Items which can be quantified and
for which quality can be measured objectively should be
given priority, because it is easier to pay for what both
the purchaser and seller can easily measure. Improved
provider payment methods should also be considered, in
part to minimize the unintended consequences under
fee-for-service for services not explicitly rewarded in the
performance contract.
We find that residents do not generally trust the qual-
ity of CHS, although residents who had visited a CHS
showed more positive attitudes. These results are con-
sistent with previous literature. For example, Yang and
Yang [32] studied community health organizations in
five cities, finding that that urban Chinese “do not gen-
erally trust community health service centers” [32,
p.624] and that patients who were poor, unemployed, or
uninsured were most likely to use community health
centers. In our Shandong data, residents were more will-
ing to do a routine health exam at community health
stations if they were of low socioeconomic status (as
measured either by education or income) and if the sta-
tion was privately owned. Residents who had visited a
CHS showed more positive attitudes toward private
providers than public providers.
Table 11 Factors associated with staff satisfaction and performance scores of community health stations in Weifang
and City Y
Variables Dependent variable: Probability
satisfied with current job














Working years at current CHS −0.024 0.156
(0.019) (0.083)*
Dummy for junior college 0.097 0.543
(0.218) (0.703)
Dummy for college and above −0.049 −1.964
(0.294) (1.783)
Dummy for job positions manager −0.024 0.741
(0.314) (1.015)
logistics worker −1.059 0.437
(0.282)*** (0.952)














Notes: 1) Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the CHS level; 2) ***, **, * refer to 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance level, respectively.
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results are based on cross-sectional data. Without sys-
tematic historical data or a dedicated baseline survey
in both intervention and control areas, we could not
conduct a more comprehensive comparison with adifference-in-difference methodology. Because of the
difficulty with objective quality assessment, some
conclusions are tentative. Further research should
examine the impact of non-contracted dimensions of
service and quality.j
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Case studies such as the one described in this paper pro-
vide evidence regarding the complicated challenge of ef-
fective public stewardship of private providers, which
advocates claim can improve performance and lead pri-
vate providers to serve policy goals, if incentives are
designed appropriately [33]. In some areas where gov-
ernment healthcare resources are insufficient, con-
tracting out may allow expansion toward universal
coverage more rapidly and with lower government in-
vestment.k To assess these claims in any specific institu-
tional context, data should be collected at baseline and
during implementation to allow scientific evaluation
of the contracting outcomes, and the contracting ar-
rangements themselves should be simple, clear, and
enforceable.
The next phase of China’s health reforms calls for more
active engagement with the private sector. Success in this
endeavor calls for enhanced information, transparency,
monitoring, training, communication, incentives, and
ownership-neutral access to career development and so-
cial security. In health systems such as China’s—which has
been long dominated by government providers and a leg-
acy of suspicion of private enterprise—social marketing,
public policy support, and accreditation or other guaran-
tees of qualified service can help residents eliminate dis-
criminatory perceptions of private providers. A major
concern among private providers in urban China is com-
petition for human resources, technology, and market ac-
cess (i.e., to be included in the provider network for social
insurance). Addressing these concerns could be an im-
portant step toward harnessing the entrepreneurial spirit
of private providers in pursuit of better primary care, while
rigorous evaluations help to defend the public interest
from profit-seeking at the expense of patient welfare.Endnotes
a Community health centers are larger than commu-
nity health stations in terms of beds, personnel, equip-
ment, and responsibility for population health services.
In some cases, a community health center owns and
manages the associated health stations; in other cases,
the stations are legally and functionally independent. To
simplify exposition, we use the abbreviation CHS for
both community health stations and community health
centers.
b This policy represents the first time that private
providers received public funds for capital investments
in Weifang.
c To assure objectivity and provide a quality check on
the evaluation process, 30 percent of CHS were re-
visited by a separate provincial-level evaluation team.
The final scores are S=S1/S2*S2, where S1 represents theprovincial team score and S2 the local evaluation for
each CHS.
d Only public hospitals were permitted to run commu-
nity health centers.
e The Ministry of Health set 150 m2 as the minimum
required clinic space for a CHS, and listed the equip-
ment that a CHS was required to possess.
f Unfortunately we were not able to obtain data that
allowed direct comparison of spending for the same pa-
tient diagnosis at public and private CHS. Because of the
EML policy in Weifang, we do know that patient out-of
-pocket payments were likely to be lower in Weifang
than in City Y.
g In Beijing, where CHS development started a couple
years before that in Weifang, 78.4% of interviewed
patients discharged from hospitals had heard of CHS
and 35.5% of them had visited CHS (Ding et al. 2009).
h Interestingly, separately examining the subset of
patients in Pub-C and Pri-C who had previously visited
the CHS and thus may have some knowledge and med-
ical needs, we find different associations between insur-
ance and willingness to visit the CHS: in Pub-C, the
uninsured are less likely to do routine exams at the
CHS; in Priv-C, the uninsured are more likely to do a
routine exam at the CHS. This may reflect unmeasured
differences in the resident population as well as dif-
ferences in the CHS by ownership form.
i Fewer than one in ten residents knew CHS were open
until 8 pm. That high proportions of respondents
reported willingness or desire to change community
health care providers also shows the gulf of trust be-
tween patients and grassroots providers in China.
j For example, anecdotal evidence suggests private
providers may be more likely than public providers to
over-prescribe antibiotics and intravenous injections.
k In Weifang, contracting out to private providers cost
the government about one-tenth of what it would have
cost to build new government clinics from scratch for
the communities served by private CHS.
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